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Household Debt Distributions by 
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By JISEOB KIM* 
This paper analyzes how and why household debt distribution by the 
householder age has changed over the past decade both in Korea and 
the US. Data shows that the proportion of household debt held by 
younger households has decreased, while that held by older 
households has increased. Empirical analysis shows that a change in 
the demographic distribution of householders is the main driving force 
that has shifted the household debt distribution. Given that 
demographic aging is an inevitable trend, the proportion of household 
debt held by older households is also expected to increase. Therefore, 
the Korean government must preemptively prepare for the household 
debt problem, especially for debt held by older households, by 
strengthening macro-prudential policies, preventing asset price 
deflation, restructuring household debt contract structures, and 
reforming labor market inflexibility. 
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I. Introduction 
 
ousehold debt in Korea has steadily increased since the early 2000s, with the 
growth rate accelerating more rapidly since 2012. Accordingly, policymakers 
and researchers in Korea have been seriously concerned about the consistent 
increase in household debt. Those who claim that the current level of household 
debt is too high argue that large amounts of household debt can lead to a 
deterioration in economic growth (e.g., Cecchetti et al. 2011; IMF 2012; Bornhorst 
and Arranze (2013)). On the other hand, some argue that the general quality of 
household debt in Korea is moderate, as the majority of household debt is held by 
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high-income and high-asset households (e.g., Hahm et al. 2010; Kim and Byun 
2012; Kim and Yoo 2013).  
In this paper, I analyze the household debt problem considering the aging 
population. More specifically, I examine how and why the household debt 
distribution by householder age group has changed over the past decade. It is well 
known that the elderly population has increased in Korea. Here, I analyze how the 
change in the demographic composition affects the household debt distribution by 
householder age. Moreover, I examine the effects of changes in household income 
and asset distribution on the change in the household debt distribution.  
Initially, I compare Korea’s household debt distribution by the householder’s age 
to that of the US within and across time. The main motivation for comparing those 
two countries is that Korea’s household debt-to-GDP ratio in 2013 is nearly 
identical to that of the US for 2003 and 2013 (see Figure 1). The US ratio increased 
to almost 95% and later deleveraged after the global financial crisis. Korea’s 
household debt-to-GDP ratio, on the other hand, has not experienced any large 
adjustments, even after the global financial crisis. It is well known that US 
households took out much in loans, especially mortgages, before the financial crisis. 
Low-income and low-credit (or subprime-level) households could easily take out 
large amounts of loans before the economic crash (Mian and Sufi 2009; Keys et al. 
2013; and others). By comparing the 2004 US household debt distribution, when 
loans were carelessly issued, to Korea’s recent household debt distribution, I can 
examine the risk level of the current Korean household debt problem, especially by 
age group.1 (Note that the aggregate levels of household debt-to-GDP ratios in 
both countries in these two years are nearly identical.) In addition, I examine 
household income, (net) assets, debt-to-income ratios, and debt-to-asset ratio 
distributions by householder’s age. By comprehensively analyzing household’s 
financial characteristics and comparing Korea to the US, I can evaluate the 
potential risks to Korean households. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. HOUSEHOLD DEBT-TO-GDP RATIOS FOR KOREA AND THE US 
 
Note: Data are from the OECD and the Bank of Korea. Household debt data in the flow of funds table 
is used. 
 
1Because the US data used in this paper is not surveyed annually, the data wave of 2004 is selected. Please see 
the next section for more details about data sources.  
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Next, I analyze how the household debt distribution by householder age group 
has changed over the last ten years (in the case of the US, I can examine changes 
over the last 20 years).2 The data shows that the proportion of household debt held 
by (relatively) younger households has decreased, while that of older households 
has increased over the last ten years. Specifically, the household debt distribution 
by the householder age group has shifted to the right. Moreover, the income, asset, 
and demographic distribution of households by householder age have all 
simultaneously shifted to the right. The shift in the income distribution is mainly 
driven by the changes in demographic factors. That is, as the proportion of older 
households increases, the proportion of income held by older households also 
increases. However, this explanation does not apply to household debt or asset 
distributions. Even after controlling for demographic factor, the proportion of 
household debt and assets held by young households has decreased, while that held 
by older households has increased. We can also observe such patterns in the US.  
This motivates me to examine which factors mainly drive the change in the 
household debt distribution. More specifically, I consider household debt 
distribution by householder age group in 2004 and 20123 and analyze which 
household-specific characteristics affect changes in these distributions. Applying 
DiNardo et al. (1996), I consider a counter-factual 2004 household debt 
distribution where only the householder age distribution follows the distribution of 
2012, while other household-specific characteristics remain in line with the 2004 
distribution. By analyzing the results of this exercise, I can examine the effects of 
changes in householder’s demographic distribution over the last ten years on the 
household debt distribution. Similarly, I simulate a counter-factual scenario where 
only the household income (asset) distribution follows the distribution of 2012, 
with other household characteristics remaining in line with the 2004 distribution. 
Accordingly, the change in the householder demographic composition is the main 
driver behind the change in the household debt distribution by householder age. 
The demographic factor can explain the shift in the household debt distribution 
nearly by half. On the other hand, changes in either the income or asset distribution 
do not fully explain the change in the household debt distribution. I can also draw 
similar conclusions for the US, though the explanatory power of the change in the 
demographic composition is smaller than in Korea.  
Given that demographic aging is an inevitable trend in Korea, as well as in the 
US, the proportion of household debt held by older households is also expected to 
increase. Hence, the Korean government must preemptively prepare for the 
household debt problem, especially for debt held by older households before the 
problem is exacerbated. Here, I propose policy directions which should be 
considered by the Korean government. First, the government should speed up the 
reforming of labor market inflexibility to prevent a sudden drop in household 
income when the householder reaches retirement age. Second, policymakers should 
monitor the possibility of asset price deflation more carefully. Third, household 
debt contracts in Korea should be restructured from the short-run bullet type to 
 
2In the case of Korea, the sample period of available micro-data is insufficient. Please see section II for more 
details.  
3I used the most recently released KLIPS data (2012) and the 2004 wave of the KLIPS. In the case of the US, 
I choose the survey years of 2004 and 2013. The data section offers additional details. 
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long-run amortization loans. Lastly, macro-prudential policies, such as debt-to-
income (DTI) regulations, must be strengthened to spread the risk from unexpected 
adverse shocks.  
There are many papers that analyze the potential risk of household debt in Korea. 
However, to the best of my knowledge, no studies have analyzed the structural risk 
of household debt which originates from an aging population. Kim and Byun (2012) 
analyzed individual-level debt distributions by income, credit score, occupation, 
financial intermediary type, age, and regional groups. Hahm et al. (2010) and Kim 
and Yoo (2013) also implemented a similar empirical exercise. Generally, these 
papers conclude that the current level of Korean household debt is not high enough 
to threaten the stability of financial system. However, certain types of households, 
such as low-income, non-banking debtors, are potentially vulnerable in negative 
stress scenarios. These papers commonly analyze household debt distributions by 
diverse debtor-specific characteristics at a certain time. Unlike those papers, I 
examine household debt distributions from a long-term perspective and analyze 
how and why the household debt distribution has changed structurally.  
Other papers examine how household debt responds to unexpected exogenous 
shocks. Jeong and Kang (2013) analyzed household debt responses from 
unexpected changes in productivity (TFP), interest rates, or house prices. 
Justiniano et al. (2015) assert that the leverage and deleverage in US household 
debt is mainly driven by households’ taste for housing services. These papers 
commonly used a DSGE-style model and introduced certain exogenous shocks. My 
analysis regarding changes in household debt is driven more by a structural factor: 
changes in the demographic composition. In addition, this paper, unlike other 
papers, analyzes the household debt distribution rather than aggregate amounts (or 
levels) of household debt.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the 
micro-data used in this paper. Section III compares Korea and US household debt 
distributions in a certain survey year (through a static comparison or a cross-section 
analysis). Section IV examines how the household debt distribution both in Korea 
and the US has changed over the last decade (via a dynamic comparison or a time-
series analysis). Section V analyzes which factor(s) has (have) mainly driven the 
change in the household debt distribution over the past ten years. Finally, section 
VI concludes with policy implications.   
 
II. Data Description 
 
I used two household level micro-data to analyze the Korean household debt 
distribution: the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) and the Survey of 
Household Finances and Living Conditions (SHFLC). KLIPS is a panel dataset 
which initiated in 1999. The most recently released survey was in 2012. SHFLC 
started in 2010, and the most recently updated survey was done in 2014. SHFLC is 
a panel structure between 2010 and 2011. Afterward, SHFLC re-sampled the 
interviewees in 2012, hence taking on a panel structure for the period of 2012 to 
2014. SHFLC contains more finely categorized household asset and debt 
information than KLIPS. Unfortunately, because the initial survey year of SHFLC 
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is 2010, I used KLIPS and SHFLC simultaneously to analyze the structural 
changes in the household debt distribution over the decade.  
For the US case, I used the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) released by the 
Federal Reserve Board. SCF is similar to SHFLC, though with many more 
questionnaires. SCF has been released every three years, starting in 1983, and is 
not a panel dataset. Given that this paper analyzes the cross-sectional distributions 
of household debt over different years, a panel structure is not in fact necessary.4 
Each dataset contains different household debt and asset categories. Hence, we 
need to clarify how aggregate household-level debt and assets are calculated. For 
KLIPS, household debt is the sum of financial debt (including secured and 
unsecured debt), non-financial debt, personal debt, jeonse5 deposits owed to 
renters, debt owed to mutual assistance society (or lodge money debt), and other 
loans. Similarly, aggregate household-level debt in SHFLC is defined by summing 
up the following components: financial debt, which includes both secured and 
unsecured debt; lodge money debt; debts related to credit cards; and jeonse 
deposits owed to renters. For SCF, total household debt is the sum of the following 
debt categories: mortgage/land contracts, debt related to investment real estate and 
vacation properties, business debt, vehicle loans, land contracts and notes (debt), 
credit card debt, home equity lines of credit, lines of credit not secured by 
residential property, education loans, other loans, loans for home improvement, 
other debt, margin loans, loans backed by insurance, and loans backed by pensions. 
Similar to household debt, each dataset also defines household-level assets 
differently. For KLIPS, the sum of the housing value, jeonse deposits, and financial 
assets6 is defined as the household total assets.7 For SHFLC, household assets are 
calculated as the sum of financial assets, which includes all types of savings and 
financial investments, jeonse deposits, and real assets including real estate and non-
real estate real assets. Household assets in SCF are defined by summing up the 
following components: the value of the primary residence, investment real estate 
and vacation properties; business equity; vehicles; financial assets;8 other assets; 
and land contracts and notes.  
Table 1 summarizes household debt, income, assets, and net assets both in Korea 
and the US. The fraction of households that hold any type of debt (real-estate-
related debt) in Korea is 65% (30%), while it is 77% (49%) and 75% (45%) in 
2004 and 2013, respectively, in the US. Because it is meaningless to compare the 
levels of household debt between two countries, I measure the household debt 
burden by calculating the debt-to-income and the debt-to-asset ratios in both 
countries. The household debt-to-income ratio in Korea is 1.28 in 2014, while the  
 
4Since each survey asks the exact amount of remaining household debt, I can calculate and compare 
household debt-related moments by using these different data sources.  
5Jeonse is one way of leasing a house in Korea. Instead of paying monthly rents, a renter makes a lump-sum 
deposit on a rental space, which is around 70% of the market value.  
6Financial asset is the sum of the following components: saving, stock, bond, mutual fund, insurance, lodge 
money, uncollected loan. 
7KLIPS also contains some non-real estate real asset categories, such as vehicle, jewelry, artwork, and 
golf/condominium memberships. However, these asset categories are only included in limited waves of the survey. 
To make a consistent asset measure within KLIPS, I excluded those categories.  
8Financial asset is the sum of the following components: checking account, IRA/Keogh, certificate deposit, 
saving/MMF, mutual fund/hedge fund, saving bond, any other bonds, stocks, brokerage account, annuity/any 
trust/managed investment account, life insurance 
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TABLE 1—SUMMARY STATISTICS OF HOUSEHOLD DEBT, INCOME, AND ASSETS IN KOREA AND THE US 
 Korea (2014) 
US 
(2004)9 
US     
(2013) 
Total household debt
% of households holding debt 65% 77%  75% 
Average amount of total debt ₩59,941,762 $108,959 $101,449 
Median amount of total debt ₩10,000,000   $29,168 $22,500 
Average amount of total debt conditional on having debt ₩91,174,289 $142,354 $135,849 
Median amount of total debt conditional on having debt ₩40,000,000 $70,892 $63,040 
Total real estate related debt
% of households holding real estate debt 30% 49%  45% 
Average amount of real estate debt ₩29,349,407 $93,363 $85,594 
Median amount of real estate debt ₩0      $0      $0 
Average amount of real estate debt conditional on having real estate debt ₩98,711,051 $188,645 $189,388 
Median amount of real estate debt conditional on having real estate debt ₩60,000,000 $120,867 $119,000 
Household income 
Average income ₩46,760,775 $84,052 $84,024 
Median income ₩38,000,000 $51,800 $45,000 
Average income conditional on having debt ₩54,376,386 $91,125 $90,390 
Median income conditional on having debt ₩45,000,000 $59,200 $54,000 
Average income conditional on having real estate debt ₩60,973,678 $113,234 $118,268 
Median income conditional on having real estate debt ₩51,000,000 $75,234 $74,000 
Household assets 
Average assets ₩333,643,540 $619,874 $580,805 
Median assets ₩193,600,000 $196,964 $154,450 
Average assets conditional on having debt ₩403,953,840 $615,746 $560,155 
Median assets conditional on having debt ₩249,000,000 $216,451 $175,851 
Average assets conditional on having real estate debt ₩492,215,490 $833,011 $802,991 
Median assets conditional on having real estate debt ₩326,700,000 $328,315 $283,900 
Household net asset10 
Average net assets ₩273,701,780 $510,915 $479,356 
Median net assets ₩154,530,000 $100,024 $63,800 
Average net assets conditional on having debt ₩312,779,550 $473,392 $424,305 
Median net assets conditional on having debt ₩185,570,000 $104,020 $64,400 
Average net assets conditional on having real estate debt ₩347,733,360 $623,259 $592,272 
Median net assets conditional on having real estate debt ₩223,310,000 $173,901 $126,600 
 
ratio is 1.30 and 1.21 in 2004 and 2013, respectively, in the US.11 The household 
debt-to-income ratio conditional on having household debt is 1.68 in Korea, while 
it is 1.56 and 1.50 in 2004 and 2013, respectively, in the US. Hence, Korean 
households have slightly larger amounts of household debt in terms of their income 
than the US households. We can also observe even through the micro-level data 
that households in the US deleveraged their debts after the global financial crisis 
(in terms of their income). 
The household debt-to-asset ratio in Korea is 0.18, while the ratio in the US is 
0.18 and 0.17 in 2004 and 2013, respectively. The household debt-to-asset ratio 
conditional on holding debt in Korea is 0.23, while it is 0.23 and 0.24 in 2004 and 
2013, respectively, in the US. Household debt held by Korean households in terms 
of their assets is quite similar to that held by US households. Given that the average 
 
9Unit: 2013 USD 
10Net assets = Total household assets - Total household debt 
11The ratio of household debt to income in Korea is calculated by ₩59,941,762/₩46,760,775 
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housing price in the US decreased significantly in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, the average household assets in the micro-level data also decreased 
by 6.3%. At the same time, US households also deleveraged their debt after the 
financial crisis, leading to identical US household debt-to-asset ratios in 2004 and 
2013.  
Using aggregate household debt statistics masks several important features and 
the potential vulnerability related to household debt in Korea. Hence, I examine the 
Korean household debt distribution and compare it to the distribution in the US. 
More specifically, I mainly focus on household debt distributions by householder 
age. It is well known that Korean society is aging, and the speed of this trend is 
more rapid than in any other OECD member country. The general trend is the same 
in the US, though the speed of population aging is slower. I sampled households in 
which the householder’s age is between 20 and 79, which covers nearly every 
household that carries on economic activities. It is known that the SCF data surveys 
very wealthy households. Hence, I dropped extremely rich or highly indebted US 
households when calculating statistical moments.12 (Specific explanations are in 
the footnotes of each figure and table in the next section.)  
 
III. Static Analysis of Household Debt Distribution 
 
In this section, I compare the 2014 Korean household debt distribution by 
householder age to the 2004 US household debt distribution. As shown in Figure 1, 
the recent household debt-to-GDP ratio in Korea is similar to the 2003 and 2013 
ratios in the US. Before the global financial crisis, the US household debt increased 
monotonically. Next, US households deleveraged their debt through government-
driven loan-modification programs, foreclosures, bankruptcies, and other measures 
(Gerardi and Li 2010 and Robinson 2009). Given that the 2014 Korea and 2004 US 
data are similar in terms of household debt-to-GDP ratio levels and their increasing 
trends, I initially choose those two years and compare the household debt 
distributions of two countries.  
I define two measures which I mainly use in this paper to analyze household 
debt distributions by householder age. First, I calculate what portions of debt are 
held by a certain age group. Let im  be the amount of debt held by household i , 
and iw  be the sample weight. Then, the proportion of debt held by a certain age 
group can be calculated as follows: 
 
(1)         =
i ii Age group
Age group
i ii All population
w m
Q
w m
∈
∈
∑
∑   
 
Under this measure, the debt-holding ratio by a certain age group may increase 
when the number of people in the age group is large enough. In order to control for 
an age-specific population effect, I define the second measure as shown below.  
 
12Please see the following FRB report (http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/files/index_kennickell. 
html) I also calculated moments without excluding extremely rich or indebted households in the Appendix. 
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HOUSEHOLD DEBT RATIO BY  
HOUSEHOLDER AGE 
RATIO OF PER-HOUSEHOLD DEBT TO 
THE AVERAGE OF ALL HOUSEHOLDS 
 
FIGURE 2  
 
Note: US Households with debt in the top 1% are dropped.  
Source: (Korea) 2014 SHFLC; (US) 2004 SCF 
 
(2)  =
i i ii Age group i Age group
Age group
i i ii All population i All population
w m / w
P
w m / w
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
∑ ∑
∑ ∑   
 
This is the ratio of the average debt held by a certain age group to the average 
debt held by the whole population. Hence, this ratio measures the relative amounts 
of debt held by a certain age group while controlling for demographic effects.  
Figure 2 compares the 2014 Korea to the 2004 US household debt distributions 
by the householder age group. The left figure is the debt-holding ratio by 
householder’s age ( Age groupQ ), and the right figure is the ratio of the average 
amount of debt held by a certain age to the average of all households ( Age groupP ). 
The older population in Korea holds a greater portion of the debt compared to this 
segment in the US, particularly those in their 50s. The debt of Korean households 
with householders in their 50s accounts for approximately 33% of all household 
debt, while it is 23% in the US, even lower than the debt held by those in their 40s. 
When I control for the demographic differences between Korea and the US, Korean 
household debt is comparatively more concentrated in the older-aged groups, 
particularly those in their 50s. Korean households with householders in their 50s 
are carrying 28% more debt than that held by the average household of the entire 
economy, which is higher by about 16% in the US. Due to the high proportion of 
the population in their 50s, along with the large amount of average debt, in Korea, 
the absolute proportion of their debts is much higher than that in the US. 
Having large amounts of household debt may not be a serious problem if 
households have high enough income or asset simultaneously. In Figure 3, I present 
the household income distribution by householder age group. I similarly consider 
two measures: the proportion of household income held by a certain age group, and  
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HOUSEHOLD ANNUAL INCOME RATIO BY 
HOUSEHOLDER AGE 
RATIO OF PER-HOUSEHOLD ANNUAL INCOME TO 
THE AVERAGE OF ALL HOUSEHOLDS 
 
FIGURE 3 
 
Note: US Households with incomes in the top 1% are dropped. 
Source: (Korea) 2014 SHFLC; (US) 2004 SCF 
 
 
HOUSEHOLD TOTAL ASSET RATIO BY 
HOUSEHOLDER AGE 
RATIO OF PER-HOUSEHOLD TOTAL ASSET TO  
THE AVERAGE OF ALL HOUSEHOLDS 
 
FIGURE 4 
 
Note: US Households with assets in the top 1% are dropped. 
Source: (Korea) 2014 SHFLC; (US) 2004 SCF 
 
the ratio of the average income of a certain age group to the average of all 
households. The figure shows that Koreans experience a sharp decline in their 
incomes after their retirement age, implying that older people are more likely to 
face repayment and liquidity problems. The proportion of income earned by the 
population in their 50s in Korea is higher than that in the US, which is mainly 
attributed to population effects. 
Figure 4 reports the asset distribution by householder age. Older people in Korea 
own comparatively fewer assets than the same age group in the US. The average 
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amounts of assets held by the older group, especially those in their 60s, are higher 
than those held by younger people both in Korea and the US. However, the average 
asset held by the older population in Korea is low relative to that in the US. 
Similar to the asset distribution, older Koreans have lower amounts of net assets 
compared to the US households, as presented in Figure 5. Hence, these households 
in Korea, for whom income levels are also lower than those in the US, are more 
likely to be vulnerable to adverse asset price or liquidity shocks compared to their 
counterparts in the US. 
 
 
HOUSEHOLD NET ASSET RATIO BY 
HOUSEHOLDER AGE 
RATIO OF PER-HOUSEHOLD NET ASSET TO  
THE AVERAGE OF ALL HOUSEHOLDS 
 
FIGURE 5 
 
Note: US Households with assets in the top 1% are dropped.  
Source: (Korea) 2014 SHFLC; (US) 2004 SCF 
 
 
HOUSEHOLD DEBT-TO-INCOME RATIO BY 
HOUSEHOLDER AGE 
HOUSEHOLD DEBT-TO-ASSET RATIO BY 
HOUSEHOLDER AGE 
 
FIGURE 6 
 
Note: US households with either income or asset levels in the top 1% are dropped.  
Source: (Korea) 2014 SHFLC; (US) 2004 SCF 
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In sum, Korea’s debt-to-income ratio increases as householders become older, 
unlike the US, and Korea’s debt-to-asset ratio does not decrease as rapidly as that 
of the US. The US debt-to-income ratio decreases as householders become older, as 
US people tend to borrow early in their lives and repay the debt throughout their 
life, including mortgages and education loans. On the other hand, the ratio in Korea 
is much higher than that in the US especially when people reach retirement age. 
Unlike the US, Korean households tend to take out loans without repaying the 
principal over their life cycle. Instead, they simply refinance the loans every 2-5 
years, rolling over the debt again until their retirement age. In addition, a sudden 
drop in income after retirement age may be another factor which increases the debt 
burden of the older population in Korea. A similar interpretation can be applied to 
the debt-to-asset ratio. Because older Koreans have large amounts of debt even 
after their retirement age, along with lower assets than their US counterparts, the 
debt burden of older people, as evaluated by their assets, is greater in Korea.  
 
IV. Dynamic Analysis of Household Debt Distribution 
 
In the previous section, I examined household debt distributions during a certain 
survey year. In this section, I compare how the household debt distribution has 
changed over the last ten years (20 years in the case of the US). Then, I can analyze 
whether the household debt problem is a static (or time-invariant) or dynamic 
problem. If it turns out that the household debt distribution changes over time, we 
can estimate the potential change in the household debt distribution in the future 
and preemptively prepare policy measures to resolve the problem.  
Figure 7 presents the Korean household debt distributions by householder age in 
2004 and 2014. The proportion of debts held by older households has gradually 
increased over the last ten years, while the debt held by households less than 40 
 
 
HOUSEHOLD DEBT RATIO BY 
HOUSEHOLDER AGE IN KOREA 
RATIO OF PER-HOUSEHOLD DEBT TO 
THE AVERAGE OF ALL HOUSEHOLDS IN KOREA 
 
FIGURE 7 
 
Source: 2004 KLIPS and 2014 SHFLC 
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HOUSEHOLD DEBT RATIO BY 
HOUSEHOLDER AGE IN THE US 
RATIO OF PER-HOUSEHOLD DEBT TO 
THE AVERAGE OF ALL HOUSEHOLDS IN THE US 
 
FIGURE 8 
 
Note: US Households with debt in the top 1% are dropped.  
Source: 1995, 2004, and 2013 SCF 
 
years of age had decreased. When I control for the effect of demographic changes, 
the average debt held by those in their 60-70s shows an increase, whereas that of 
the other age group shows a decrease. Hence, the Korean household debt 
distribution by householder age has shifted to the right over the last ten years. 
The household debt distribution in the US also has shifted to the right over the 
last 20 years. The proportion of debt held by young households has decreased, 
while that held by older households has increased. When I control for demographic 
changes, the average household debt held by those in their 60-70s has increased, 
especially after the recent financial crisis.  
I also examine the changes in household income distributions by householder 
age, as in the household debt distribution. The Korean household income 
distribution has similarly shifted to the right over the past ten years. That is, the 
proportion of household income held by those in their 50s has increased, while that 
held by those in their 30-40s has decreased over the past ten years. The change in 
the household income distribution is mainly driven by changes in the demographic 
compositions. As the number of older households increases, the portion of the total 
income held by these households also increases.  
We can also observe similar patterns of changes in the household income 
distribution in the US. The proportion of the total household income held by young 
households has decreased, while that held by older households has increased. When 
I control for the demographic effects, the average household income (normalized 
by the average of all households) is nearly identical, especially between 1995 and 
2004.  
The proportion of household income held by older Korean households is much 
lower than that held by their counterpart group in the US. In addition, the average 
amount of income for Korea’s older households is much lower than that in the US. 
This pattern is also found nearly ten years ago. Hence, the fact that Korean 
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FIGURE 9 
 
Source: 2004 KLIPS and 2014 SHFLC 
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FIGURE 10 
 
Note: US Households with incomes in the top 1% are dropped.  
Source: 1995, 2004, and 2013 SCF 
 
households, on average, tend to experience a steep decline in their income once 
they retire from their jobs is a persistent problem which has not recently been 
demonstrated.  
Household assets held by older Korean households have increased slightly over 
time. However, the proportion of assets held by older Korean households is much 
lower than that in the US. At the same time, the average asset level is lower in 
Korea compared to the US. 
In sum, the proportion of household debt held by each age group has shifted over 
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FIGURE 11 
 
Source: 2004 KLIPS and 2014 SHFLC 
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FIGURE 12 
 
Note: US Households with assets in the top 1% are dropped.  
Source: 1995, 2004, and 2013 SCF 
 
the last ten years. At the same time, the distributions of household income and 
assets have also shifted to the right. Therefore, when we prepare policy measures to 
resolve the household debt problem, we must understand the nature of the 
household debt distribution, which is not time-invariant. In the following section, I 
analyze why the household debt distribution has shifted both in Korea and in the 
US. In turn, I examine estimated changes in the household debt distribution in the 
near future and draw policy implications. 
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V. Analyzing the Driving Forces behind the Changes in  
the Household Debt Distribution 
 
In the previous section, I found that household debt, income, and asset 
distributions by householder age group have shifted over the past ten years. In this 
section, I analyze the main driving force that has shifted the household debt 
distribution. More specifically, I analyze whether changes in demographic (or age), 
income, or asset distributions have shifted household debt distributions, as well as 
how much each component has contributed to the shift. This analysis is based on 
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) and its application. 
 
A. Analysis Methodology 
 
Let ( )i im , z , t  be an observation specific to household i , where m  is the 
amount of household debt, z  denotes the household-specific characteristics, and 
t  is a (survey) year which takes only two values to examine the change in the 
distribution from the initial to the terminal year of the analysis. Let ( )tf m  be 
household debt density function (pdf) at time t . The unconditional household debt 
density function can then be rewritten as follows: 
 
(3)     ( ) ( ) ( )= = = = = =t m z m zf m f m| z,t t dF( z | t t ) f m;t t ,t t∫   
 
That is, the unconditional density, ( )tf m , is the integral of the conditional 
density of household debt at time mt  over the distribution of the household 
characteristics density function ( )=zdF z | t t  at time zt .  
Suppose that the household characteristics z  is composed of four components: 
the householder age ( )1z , income ( )2z , asset ( )3z , and other characteristics 
( )4z . That is, ( )= 1 2 3 4z z ,z ,z ,z . Then, we can rewrite the above density function 
as follows:   
 
(4)        ( )= = =
1 2 3 4 2 3 4m z |z ,z ,z z ,z ,zf m;t t ,t t ,t t  
( ) ( )= = =
1 2 3 41 2 3 4 m 1 2 3 4 z |z ,z ,zf m| z ,z ,z ,z ,t t dF z | z ,z ,z ,t t∫   
=
2 3 42 3 4 z ,z ,z
dF( z ,z ,z | t t )   
 
Following the notation of DiNardo et al. (1996), we consider a counter-factual 
time t  household debt density for which the household characteristics except for 
1z  remain at their t -year and the z1  distribution is switched to their t' -year 
where t t'≠ . For example, we can imagine a hypothetical 2004 ( t ) household debt 
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distribution in which only the householder’s age distribution follows their 2012 ( t' ) 
and all other household characteristics distributions remain at their 2004 ( t ). Such 
a counter-factual density can be written as 
 
(5)       ( )= = =
1 2 3 4 2 3 4m z |z ,z ,z z ,z ,zf m;t t ,t t',t t   
( ) ( )= = =
1 2 3 41 2 3 4 m 1 2 3 4 z |z ,z ,zf m| z , z , z , z , t t dF z | z , z , z , t t'∫   
   =
2 3 42 3 4 z ,z ,z
dF( z , z , z | t t )   
( ) ( )= =
1 2 3 41 2 3 4 m z |z .z .z 1 2 3 4
f m| z ,z ,z ,z ,t t Ψ z ,z ,z ,z∫   
( )   = =
1 2 3 4 2 3 41 2 3 4 z |z ,z ,z 2 3 4 z ,z ,zdF z | z ,z ,z ,t t dF( z ,z ,z | t t )   
 
where ( )
1 2 3 4z |z .z .z 1 2 3 4Ψ z , z , z , z  is a weighting function defined by 
 
(6)  ( ) ( )( )
=
=
=
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 z |z ,z ,z
z |z .z .z 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 z |z ,z ,z
dF z | z , z , z , t t'Ψ z , z , z , z
dF z | z , z , z , t t
  
 
The only difference between the original household debt density function and the 
counter-factual density function is the weight function, ( )
1 2 3 4z |z .z .z 1 2 3 4Ψ z ,z ,z ,z . 
The weighting function can be reorganized using Bayes’ rule, as follows: 
 
(7) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
=
= =
= =
= =
=
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
z |z ,z ,z 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 z |z ,z ,z z |z ,z ,z 2 3 4
z |z .z .z 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 z |z ,z ,z z |z ,z ,z 1 2 3 4
z |z ,z ,z 2 3 4
Pr t t' | z ,z ,z ,z
dF z | z ,z ,z ,t t' Pr( t t' | z ,z ,z )
Ψ z ,z ,z ,z
dF z | z ,z ,z ,t t Pr t t | z ,z ,z ,z
Pr( t t | z ,z ,z )
 
 
In the actual computation, I used the probit model to solve the last term of the 
above equation. That is, dummy variables are generated, which are 1 if the data 
year is t'  and 0 otherwise. Similarly, another dummy variable is generated, which 
is 1 if the data year is t  and 0 otherwise. In such a case, for example, the 
weighting function can be calculated as follows: 
 
(8)       ( ) ( )= =
1 2 3 4z |z ,z ,z 1 2 3 4Pr t t' | z ,z ,z ,z Φ βz   
 
In the actual implementation, I used the age of the household head, the square of 
his/her age, log real assets, log real income, an education dummy (1 if less than a 
high school degree, 0 otherwise), homeownership status, and the number of 
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household members.  
Because I mainly analyzed how the household debt distribution by householder 
age changes over time, it is necessary to manipulate the unconditional density 
function to obtain the household debt distribution by householder age group. The 
portion of household debt held by each age group can be rewritten as follows: 
  
(9)  
( )
( )
= = =
= = =
1 2 3 4 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 2 3 4
i i m z |z ,z ,z z ,z ,zi Age group Age group
i i m z |z ,z ,z z ,z ,zi All population All population
w m mf m;t t ,t t ,t t dm
w m mf m;t t ,t t ,t t dm
∈
∈
≈
∑ ∫
∑ ∫   
 
Similarly, we consider the counter-factual time- t  household debt distribution by 
householder age where only the z1  distribution changes of their time- t'  and 
other household characteristics remain at their time- t .  
 
(10) 
( )
( )
= = =
= = =
1 2 3 4 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 2 3 4
m z |z ,z ,z z ,z ,zAge group
m z |z ,z ,z z ,z ,zAll population
mf m;t t ,t t',t t dm
mf m;t t ,t t',t t dm
∫
∫  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
= = =
=
= = =
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 m z |z .z .z 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 z |z ,z ,z 2 3 4 z ,z ,z
Age
1 2 3 4 m z |z .z .z 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 z |z ,z ,z 2 3 4 z ,z ,z
Pop
m f m|z ,z ,z ,z ,t t Ψ z ,z ,z ,z dF z |z ,z ,z ,t t dF z ,z ,z |t t dm
m f m|z ,z ,z ,z ,t t Ψ z ,z ,z ,z dF z |z ,z ,z ,t t dF z ,z ,z |t t d
∫
∫
∫
∫ m
 
( )
( )
1 2 3 4i
1 2 3 4i
i z |z .z .z 1 2 3 4 ijiji Age group j|m
i z |z .z .z 1 2 3 4 ijiji All population j|m
m Ψ z ,z ,z ,z w
m Ψ z ,z ,z ,z w
∈ ∀
∈ ∀
≈
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 
( )
( )=
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
i z |z .z .z 1 2 3 4 iii Age group
i z |z .z .z 1 2 3 4 iii All population
mΨ z ,z ,z ,z w
mΨ z ,z ,z ,z w
∈
∈
∑
∑   
 
Therefore, the counter-factual household debt distribution by householder 
age can be calculated using the newly defined weighting function, 
( )
1 2 3 4z |z .z .z 1 2 3 4Ψ z ,z ,z ,z w .  
Here, I only consider cases in which only the distribution of z1  changes to the 
year t' . We can also extend the household debt density function where the 
distribution of 1z  and 2z  both change to the year t' , while the other 
characteristics remain at time t . Then, the counter-factual unconditional density 
function can be written as follows, 
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(11)   ( )= = = =
1 2 3 4 2 3 4 3 4m z |z ,z ,z z |z ,z z ,zf m;t t ,t t',t t',t t   
( ) ( )= = =
1 2 3 41 2 3 4 m 1 2 3 4 z |z ,z ,zf m| z ,z ,z ,z ,t t dF z | z ,z ,z ,t t'∫   
= =
2 3 4 3 42 3 4 z |z ,z 3 4 z ,z
dF( z | z ,z ,t t')dF( z ,z | t t )  
( ) ( ) ( )= = =
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 41 2 3 4 m z |z .z .z 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 z |z ,z ,zf m| z ,z ,z ,z ,t t Ψ z ,z ,z ,z dF z | z ,z ,z ,t t∫  
 
( ) = =
2 3 4 2 3 4 3 4z |z .z 2 3 4 2 3 4 z |z ,z 3 4 z ,zΨ z ,z ,z dF( z | z ,z ,t t )dF( z ,z | t t )   
 
where the additional weighting function can be defined by 
 
(12)  ( ) ( )( )
=
=
=
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4 z |z ,z
z |z .z 2 3 4
2 3 4 z |z ,z
dF z | z ,z ,t t'Ψ z ,z ,z
dF z | z ,z ,t t
 . 
 
The other procedures are identical to those used earlier. The only difference is 
that the new weighting function when calculating the household debt distribution 
by householder age is ( ) ( )
1 2 3 4 2 3 4z |z .z .z 1 2 3 4 z |z .z 2 3 4Ψ z ,z ,z ,z Ψ z ,z ,z w, rather than 
( )
1 2 3 4z |z .z .z 1 2 3 4Ψ z , z , z , z w . 
Before presenting numerical results, several factors should be noted with regard 
to the methodology presented here.13 The spirit of the methodology is similar to 
that of Oaxaca (1973). However, the Oaxaca decomposition mainly focuses on how 
the average of a variable (e.g., the average household debt) would change if the 
average of a certain explanatory variable (e.g., the average householder’s age) 
changes, ceteris paribus. Unlike Oaxaca’s methodology, DiNardo et al. (1996) 
focused on changes in the overall density if the distribution of explanatory 
variable(s) changes, ceteris paribus. As noted in DiNardo et al. (1996), this method 
cannot take into account the general equilibrium effect of a change in the 
explanatory variable(s). For example, when the household demographic 
distribution changes, the household asset or income distribution would change, in 
turn indirectly affecting the household debt distribution. This methodology cannot 
take into account such an indirect effect from changes in the density of explanatory 
variables. 
 
B. Results 
 
In this subsection, I analyze how changes in the distribution of household-
specific characteristics affect the household debt distribution by householder age 
group. As presented in the previous section, the household debt distribution has 
 
13Also see DiNardo et al. (1996) for more details about the major features of the analysis methodology. 
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shifted to the right over the past ten years. At the same time, household 
demographics, income, and asset distributions have also changed. Among those 
changes, I examine which factors mainly affect changes in the household debt 
distribution, based on the methodology suggested in the previous subsection. 
I choose two survey years, 2004 and 2012, using the KLIPS data.14 First, I 
consider a counter-factual scenario in which only household demographic (or age) 
distributions change to those of 2012, while other household characteristics remain 
at 2004. By analyzing such a counter-factual scenario, I could analyze how changes 
in demographic distributions contribute to changes in household debt distributions. 
The top left figure in Figure 13 shows that changes in the demographic distribution 
from 2004 to 2012 contribute to the change in the household debt distribution by 
nearly half (see the dotted line). A change in the household income distribution also 
slightly affects the change in the household debt distribution (see the top right 
figure). However, the effect of the change in the income distribution is smaller than 
that caused by the change in the demographic distribution. A change in the asset 
distribution has almost no effect on the household debt distribution (see the bottom 
left figure). Simultaneous changes in household income and demographic 
distributions from 2004 to 2012 cause the 2004 household debt distribution nearly 
to converge to the 2012 distribution. Therefore, a change in the demographic 
distribution, partly in conjunction with a change in the income distribution, is the 
main driving force which has shifted the Korean household debt distribution over 
the last ten years. 
To measure quantitatively how changes in each household characteristic explain 
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FIGURE 13. CHANGES IN THE HOUSEHOLD DEBT DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN 2004 AND  
2012 DRIVEN BY EITHER AGE, INCOME, OR ASSET DISTRIBUTION CHANGES 
 
14By choosing the 2004 and 2012 survey years from KLIPS, I could eliminate potential inconsistencies 
originating from different datasets. I also implemented a similar exercise using the 2004 KLIPS and the 2014 
SHFLC data. The qualitative results were nearly identical. See the Appendix.  
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FIGURE 13. CHANGES IN THE HOUSEHOLD DEBT DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN 2004 AND  
2012 DRIVEN BY EITHER AGE, INCOME, OR ASSET DISTRIBUTION CHANGES (CONTINUED) 
 
Source: 2004 and 2012 KLIPS 
 
changes in the household debt distribution, it is necessary to define the “distance” 
measure between two different densities. Let g  be the (conditional) density 
function of household debt by householder age.15 Let tg  be the household debt 
distribution at time t , and zg  be the counter-factual household debt distribution 
where only the household characteristic z  follows the 2012 distribution while 
other household characteristics remain at their 2004. The Figure 13 shows a visual 
representation of the density functions of  04g age ,  12g age , and  zg age , 
where z{age, income, asset, income and age}. I define the measure of the 
distance between two densities as follows:16 
 
(13)     ( ) ( ) ( )=a ,b a bD g age - g age d age∫   
 
The explanatory power of the change in the household debt distribution 
attributed to household characteristics z  is then measured as follows: 
 
(14)       04, 12 z, 12
04, 12
D D
D
-
  
 
15More specifically, g is defined as 
∑ wi෥mii∈Age
∑ wi෥mii∈All population
, where wi෦ is either the sample or the manipulated 
weight. If I consider a counter-factual household debt distribution, the weight wi෥  is then defined as a 
multiplication of the sample weight wi and the weighting function Ψ(·). 
16It is also possible to define other types of distance measures, such as ׬ൣgaሺageሻ-gbሺageሻ൧
2
dሺageሻ.   
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If the change in the household characteristic z  fully shifts the 2004 household 
debt distribution to 2012, the measure z , 12D  would be 0. Hence, the explanatory 
power of z  is 100%. On the other hand, if the household characteristic z  cannot 
explain any shift in the household debt distribution between 2004 and 2012, the 
measure z , 12D  would be equal to 04 , 12D . Hence, the explanatory power of z  is 
zero. 
Table 2 reports how each combination of household characteristics can explain 
changes in the household debt distribution between 2004 and 2012. A change in the 
demographic distribution can explain a change in the household debt distribution 
by nearly half. A change in the income (asset) distribution can explain a change in 
the household debt distribution by 24.8% (3.5%). Simultaneous changes in the 
household age, income, and asset distributions can explain changes in the 
household debt distribution by 64%. However, there remains 36% of the change in 
the household debt distribution which is not explained by simultaneous changes in 
the household age, income, and asset distributions. I suspect that changes in the 
financial market environment or household-specific idiosyncratic shocks may 
account for this unexplained gap.  
This leads to the question of how much household income, asset, and 
demographic distributions have changed over the last 10 years. Figure 14 presents  
 
TABLE 2—DECOMPOSING CHANGES IN THE KOREAN HOUSEHOLD DEBT DISTRIBUTION BY  
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS 
 Explanatory Power 
Effect of Age 53.6% 
Income 24.8% 
Asset 3.5% 
Age + Income  62.1% 
Age + Asset 53.8% 
Income + Asset 27.7% 
Age + Income + Asset 64.0% 
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KERNEL DENSITY OF 2004 AND  
2012 HOUSEHOLDER AGE IN KOREA 
 
 
FIGURE 14 (CONTINUED) 
 
Note: A Gaussian kernel function is used.  
Source: 2004 and 2012 KLIPS 
 
the kernel density of the log real household income, log real assets, and the age 
distribution. Household income and asset distributions have slightly shifted to the 
right, which partly reflect the (real) growth in the Korean economy. Not 
surprisingly, the householder age distribution has shifted to the right visibly. 
Though household asset, income, and age distributions have all shifted over the last 
ten years, the change in the household debt distribution is mainly explained by the 
change in the age distribution. 
I can draw similar results for the US. As shown in Figure 15, the change in the 
demographic distribution partly affects the change in the household debt 
distribution by householder age. However, changes in the household income and 
asset distributions have nearly no effect on changes in the household debt 
distribution.  
Table 3 reports that a change in the demographic distribution can explain a 
change in the household debt distribution by 44%. However, changes in either the 
income or asset distribution have negligible explanatory power. Hence, the change 
in the household debt distribution over the last decade in the US is mainly driven 
by the change in the demographic distribution, as it was in Korea.  
Between 2004 and 2013, the US economy experienced an unprecedented boom 
and bust, especially in the housing market. More specifically, US financial 
intermediaries lent money to households with (relatively) lax screening efforts, 
which contributed to the boost in the housing market (Keys et al. (2013)). As a 
result, many subprime loans were issued, which triggered and exacerbated the 
financial crisis starting in 2007. After the crisis, the US government implemented 
many government-driven mortgage modification programs, which partly reduced 
the household financial burden. Given that the US economy experienced numerous 
events over the last ten years, explaining the change in the household debt 
distribution simply with household-specific characteristics may not be successful.  
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FIGURE 15. CHANGES IN THE HOUSEHOLD DEBT DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN 2004 AND 2013 DRIVEN BY 
EITHER AGE, INCOME, OR ASSET DISTRIBUTION CHANGES 
 
Source: 2004 and 2013 SCF 
 
TABLE 3—DECOMPOSING CHANGES IN THE US HOUSEHOLD DEBT DISTRIBUTION BY 
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS 
 Explanatory Power 
Effect of Age 44.0% 
Income 0.0% 
Asset 1.7% 
Age + Income  44.2% 
Age + Asset 41.5% 
Income + Asset 6.4% 
Age + Income + Asset 40.2% 
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KERNEL DENSITY OF THE 2004 AND  
2013 LOG REAL INCOME IN THE US 
KERNEL DENSITY OF THE 2004 AND  
2013 LOG REAL ASSETS IN THE US 
?
KERNEL DENSITY OF THE 2004 AND  
2013 HOUSEHOLDER AGE IN THE US ?
 
FIGURE 16 
 
Note: A Gaussian kernel function is used.  
Source: 2004 and 2013 SCF 
?
Kernel densities of the log real income, real asset, and age distributions are 
presented in Figure 16. The income and asset distributions have not changed 
significantly over the last ten years. However, we can observe that the US 
population is also aging. Hence, the change in the household demographic 
distribution is also an important factor which explains the shift in the household 
debt distribution in the US, as it does in Korea. 
?
VI. Concluding Remarks 
?
In this paper, I analyze how household debt distribution in Korea and the US has 
changed over the last ten years. Household debt distribution by householder’s age 
in both countries has shifted to the right. My analysis shows that the shift in the 
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household debt distribution is mainly driven by a change in householder’s 
demographic distribution, especially for Korea. Changes in either household 
income or asset distribution cannot successfully explain the shift in the household 
debt distribution. For the US, the change in demographic distribution can partly, 
though not enough, explain the change in the household debt distribution.  
One possible reason why the demographic factor has a strong power in 
explaining the shift in the household debt distribution in Korea is the Korean-
specific debt contract structure. Most mortgage and non-mortgage debt contracts in 
Korea are short-term and bullet-type loans. That is, households tend to take out 
loans with a 2-5 year contract period. And then, they repay nothing or pay only 
interests while in their contract duration. When it comes to the contract expiration 
date, households refinance loans again, with contract periods of 2-5 years. Hence, 
the loan principal does not decrease as time goes on and is rolled over repeatedly, 
with simply paying back the interest. This allows us to observe the cohort effect in 
debt distribution over the long-time. 
On the contrary, the debt contract structure in the US is quite different. 
Households tend to take out loans, especially mortgages, with a long-term horizon. 
They then pay back both interest and principal over their life cycle. In turn, 
household net equity increases as householders become older. This explains why 
the demographic effect which explains the change in the household debt 
distribution is not as strong as in the Korean case. In addition, the US economy has 
experienced a housing/asset boom and bust over the last ten years. Hence, it is 
difficult to explain the full shift in the household debt distribution merely according 
to the change in the distribution of demographic or household-specific 
characteristics.17  
We can draw the following policy implications for the Korean economy from 
this analysis. First, as Korean people become older, the proportion of household 
debt held by older households is expected to increase more in the near future.18 If 
older households have large amounts of assets and incomes, the household debt 
problem will not be serious. However, as presented in the main text, householder 
income levels for those in their 60-70s suddenly decrease. In turn, it is highly 
probable that older householders may experience more severe liquidity problems as 
they become older, along with their debt principal burden. Furthermore, the large 
portion of the income earned by older Koreans comes from either wages or income 
from businesses, while these households in the US mostly earn their income from 
social security, pensions, and annuities (or public transfers).19 That is, the incomes 
earned by Korean seniors are less secure and stable than those earned by their US 
 
17Differences in debt contract structures may lead to different patterns of the changes in the household debt 
distribution. Examining the empirical relationship between debt contract structures and household debt 
distributions would be an important future research topic. 
18One should be cautious in forecasting future household debt distributions based on my empirical analysis. 
The methodology used here assumes a “time-invariant” relationship between household debt distributions and 
household characteristic variables, except for the demographic distribution, between 2004 and 2012. It is possible 
that household asset or income distributions will change significantly in the near future, which may be the main 
effect of any change in the household debt distribution. If the macroeconomic environment changes abruptly, as 
experienced in the US over the last decade, the explanatory power of the change in the demographic distribution 
may diminish. In addition, it is possible that the general equilibrium effect of any change in the demographic 
distribution would amplify/deflate its effects on the household debt distribution.  
19Please see the Appendix for more details about the income decomposition. 
46 KDI Journal of Economic Policy NOVEMBER 2015 
counterparts. Therefore, policymakers need to consider diverse measures to 
improve and stabilize old-aged income. One possible way may be a structural 
change in the labor market which extends the retirement age of workers through 
the implementation of a wage peak system. In a similar vein, due to the seniority-
based wage system in the current Korean labor market, older employees are unable 
to avoid early retirement and become self-employed, which in general leads to a 
sudden decrease in their incomes.  
Second, Korean policymakers need to monitor the possibility of asset price 
deflation more carefully. Many researchers have found that Korean household debt 
problems will not shift toward systematic risk because Korean households have 
enough assets, providing a safe buffer for the debt problem. If Korean asset prices 
are deflated for some exogenous reasons, financial intermediaries may force 
households to pay back their debt, as their collateral value also decreases. In such a 
case, it is possible that households will start selling their assets in the market to pay 
back their remaining debt burden, which in turn would lead to a decrease in asset 
prices again. The worst scenario may be a collapse in asset values along with a 
sudden increase in household defaults. In order to avoid such a sudden drop in 
asset values while preserving a certain level of income for senior citizens, 
policymakers can consider an extension of asset-backed security markets or reverse 
mortgage programs. These programs may reduce the likelihood of a sudden drop in 
asset prices while preventing an abrupt decrease in the incomes of older 
households.  
Third, policy efforts should be strengthened to make a transition in the debt 
contract structure from short-term bullet-type to long-term amortized loans. As 
mentioned earlier, Korean households tend to roll over their debt without reducing 
their principal. This phenomenon is possible due to the prevalence of short-term 
bullet-type loans. Under an economy in which asset (or housing) values 
consistently increase, this type of loan contract structure is sustainable. That is, 
households have capital gain opportunities with a constant (nominal) value of debt. 
Hence, even when householders retire, experiencing a steep decrease in their 
incomes, they have already accumulated high enough levels of net assets while 
young. However, as the Korean economy has become more developed, the chances 
for capital gain have narrowed. Under this environment, households that take out 
loans without reducing their debt levels have little chance to realize capital gains 
(or increased net asset holdings) when they retire. Because retired households tend 
to experience a serious decrease in their incomes, these households may face both 
liquidity and net asset shocks. This motivates why Korean policymakers should 
seriously consider a change in the debt contract structure. By inducing Korean 
households to pay back their debts over their life cycle, as is done the US 
households, older Korean households can retire from their jobs without concern 
over their remaining debt, even when their incomes after retirement suddenly 
decrease.  
In sum, the household debt problem in Korea is partly a structural problem 
originating from the change in the demographic composition. It is difficult to avoid 
or reverse the changes in demographic trends. However, the Korean government 
can avoid potential system risk by strengthening macro-prudential policies and 
through labor market restructuring, asset market monitoring, enacting changes in 
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debt contract structures, and other means. It is well known that Korea’s speed of 
population aging is the fastest among OECD member countries. I recommend that 
the Korean government take action as soon as possible before the problem worsens. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
?
A. Robustness Check of Main Analysis 
?
In this Appendix, I analyze which household-specific factors cause household 
debt distribution by householder age group to move using the 2004 KLIPS and 
2014 SHFLC datasets. In the main text of this paper, I conducted the same exercise 
using 2004 and 2012 KLIPS data. Because different datasets may define and 
?
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FIGURE A1. CHANGES IN THE HOUSEHOLD DEBT DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN 2004 AND 
 2014 DRIVEN BY EITHER AGE, INCOME, OR ASSET DISTRIBUTION CHANGES 
 
Source: 2004 KLIPS and 2014 SHFLC 
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TABLE A1—DECOMPOSING CHANGES IN KOREAN HOUSEHOLD DEBT DISTRIBUTION BY  
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS 
 Explanatory Power 
Effect of Age 50.3% 
Income 16.7% 
Asset 0.9% 
Age + Income  48.2% 
Age + Asset 48.8% 
Income + Asset 25.1% 
Age + Income + Asset 40.8% 
?
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FIGURE A2 
 
Note: A Gaussian kernel function is used.  
Source: 2004 KLIPS and 2014 SHFLC 
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survey household-specific characteristics in different ways, I used a single data 
source (or KLIPS) in the main exercise. As a robustness check, I implement the 
same exercise using the most recently released data, 2014 SHFLC, along with the 
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The qualitative results are identical to those presented in the main text. The 
exercise shows that a change in the householder age distribution is the main driving 
force that shifts the household debt distribution between 2004 and 2014. The 
counter-factual distribution overestimates the debt-holding ratio for householders 
in their 40-50s. Changes in the household income distribution can partly explain 
the shift in the household debt distribution, which is consistent with results in the 
main text. 
The change in the household debt distribution between 2004 and 2014 is explained 
by the change in the demographic distribution by nearly half. On the other hand, 
the changes in the income and asset distributions can explain the changes in the 
household debt distributions by 16.7% and 0.9%, respectively. Therefore, the result 
showing that a change in the household debt distribution is mainly driven by a 
change in householder age distribution is a robust result. However, the explanatory 
power of a change in either the income or asset distribution is under-estimated 
compared to the benchmark exercise. 
In Figure A2, I present the kernel density of log real incomes, log real assets, and 
householder ages using the 2004 KLIPS and 2014 SHFLC data. Though the real 
asset and income distributions have shifted to the right over the last ten years, these 
movements have little explanatory power to explain the change in the household 
debt distribution. Not surprisingly, the density of the householder age also has 
shifted to the right over the last ten years. 
 
B. Analysis of Extreme Samples in the SCF 
 
When I analyze the US household debt distribution, I dropped sample 
households that have extremely large amounts of debt. That is, households with 
total debt in the top 1% are dropped. Because the SCF over-samples wealthy 
households when selecting its interviewees to match the wealth distribution of the 
US, I dropped these extreme sample households. Contrary to the SCF, the SHFLC 
selects its sample based on geographic areas, house occupancy types, and 
education, not considering the right tail of household wealth. Hence, by dropping 
the extremely wealthy or indebted households in the SCF, I can make a reasonable 
comparison between the SCF and the SHFLC data.  
In this appendix, I analyze how the inclusion of the top 1% indebted households 
changes the household debt statistics and distributions. In addition, I examine how 
the inclusion of the top 1% income- or asset-rich households changes the 
household income and asset distributions. As presented in Table A2, average 
household debt in 2013 in the US is around $101K, while it decreases to $83K if I 
drop the top 1% of indebted households. This indicates that highly indebted 
households distort the average statistics of household debt. A similar interpretation 
can also be made when I calculate the conditional average household debt and 
(conditional/unconditional) average real-estate-related household debt.  
In Figure A3-A5, I calculate the household debt, income, and asset distributions by 
householder age with and without including extremely indebted or rich households. 
When I include highly indebted households, household debt levels of those in their 
50s and 70s show a slight increase. However, household debt held by US 
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households in their 40-50s remains lower than that held by Korean households. The 
ratio of per-household debt to the average of all households increases, especially 
for those in their 50s and 70s, when I include highly indebted households. 
 
TABLE A2— CHARACTERISTICS OF EXTREME HOUSEHOLD SAMPLES IN THE US 
 2013 US 
 Not  
dropped 
Dropping top 1% 
household samples 
Total household debt20 
% of households holding debt 75% 74% 
Average amount of total debt $101,449 $83,255 
Median amount of total debt $22,500 $21,400 
Average amount of total debt conditional on having debt $135,849 $111,858 
Median amount of total debt conditional on having debt $63,040 $60,540 
Total real estate related debt21 
% of households holding real estate debt 45% 45% 
Average amount of real estate debt $85,594 $68,392 
Median amount of real estate debt $0 $0 
Average amount of real estate debt conditional on having real estate debt $189,388 $153,201 
Median amount of real estate debt conditional on having real estate debt $119,000 $116,000 
  
 
HOUSEHOLD DEBT RATIO BY  
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THE AVERAGE OF ALL HOUSEHOLDS IN THE US 
 
FIGURE A3 
 
Note: Households with debts in the top 1% are dropped (white bar). All sample households are included in the 
black bar.  
Source: 2013 SCF 
 
 
 
20Households with total debt in the top 1% are dropped. 
21Households with real estate debt in the top 1% are dropped. 
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HOUSEHOLD INCOME RATIO BY  
HOUSEHOLDER AGE IN THE US 
RATIO OF PER-HOUSEHOLD INCOME TO 
THE AVERAGE OF ALL HOUSEHOLDS IN THE US 
 
FIGURE A4 
  
Note: Households with incomes in the top 1% are dropped (white bar). All sample households are included in the 
black bar.  
Source: 2013 SCF 
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FIGURE A5 
 
Note: Households with incomes in the top 1% are dropped (white bar). All sample households are included in the 
black bar.  
Source: 2013 SCF 
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income ratio held by those in their 50-60s shows a slight increase. In addition, 
average incomes earned by those households also increase. I can draw the same 
qualitative interpretation when I compare the Korean household income distribution 
to that of the US without dropping the top 1% high-income samples. 
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samples, household assets held by the older groups (50-70s) increase, indicating 
that the top 1% asset-rich households are those 50 or over. Hence, senior 
households, especially those in their 60-70s, in the US tend to have larger amounts 
of assets as compared to their counterparts in Korea, even when I used all SCF 
samples.  
  
C. Household Income Composition 
 
In this section, I decompose household income according to sources in Korea 
and the US. As reported in Figure A6, there are several differences between Korea 
and the US. First, the proportion of wages earned by US households decreases 
significantly when they become older compared to that in Korea. The portion of 
wage income for those in their 20s is around 82% in Korea, which decreasing to 
46% and 23% for those in their 60s and 70s, respectively. On the other hand, US 
households in their 20s earn income from wages at a rate of nearly 88%, which 
decreases to 46% and 16% for those in their 60s and70s, respectively. Second, 
income from businesses constitutes a greater portion of Korean household income 
than in the US. That is, Korean households tend to have more self-employed (or 
private) businesses. This leads to an increase in the proportion of household debt 
for subsidizing and operating their private businesses, especially after the 
 
 
 
KOREA US22 
 
FIGURE A6. HOUSEHOLD INCOME COMPOSITION 
 
Source: 2014 SHFLC and 2013 SCF 
 
22Income categories in the SCF are not identical to those in the SHFLC. The categories in the SCF are more 
finely defined. Hence, I define income from business in the SCF as the sum of income from a sole proprietorship 
or farm and income from other businesses, investments, net rents, trusts, or royalties. I define income from wealth 
as the sum of income from non-taxable investments; income from other investments; and income from dividends; 
gains or losses from the sale of mutual funds, stock, bonds, or real estate. Public transfer income is defined as the 
sum of unemployment or worker's compensation; income from social security, annuities, pensions, and disability 
or retirement programs; and income from food stamps or other forms of welfare. Private transfers are the sum 
income from child support or alimony.  
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retirement age (not reported in this paper).23 Third, the proportion of pension 
income (or public transfers) in Korea is much smaller than that in the US. 
Household income from public transfers accounts for 15% and 28% of income for 
those in their 60s and 70s, respectively, in Korea, whereas these levels are 22% and 
50% in the US. Older people in Korea tend to depend more on income from their 
businesses or private transfers (or income transfers from their children) than their 
US counterparts. 
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